A Contraction Principle for Finite Global Games by Mathevet, Laurent
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
A CONTRACTION PRINCIPLE FOR FINITE GLOBAL GAMES
Laurent Mathevet
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1243R
December 2005
Revised March 2006
A Contraction Principle for Finite Global Games
Laurent Mathevet
Abstract
I provide a new proof of uniqueness of equilibrium in a wide class of global games. I
show that the joint best-response in these games is a contraction. The uniqueness result
then follows as a corollary of the contraction property. Furthermore, the contraction map-
ping approach provides a revealing intuition for why uniqueness arises: Complementarities
in games generate multiplicity of equilibria, but the global games structure dampens
complementarities so that only one equilibrium exists. I apply my result to show that
uniqueness is obtained through contraction in currency crises and Diamond’s search mod-
els.
JEL classification numbers: C72, D82
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1 Introduction
Many economic situations present complementarities. If we think of strategies as real
numbers, games with strategic complementarities (GSC) are games in which the marginal
utility that an agent receives from playing a greater strategy, increases as other agents
also play greater strategies. Beyond their intuitive interpretation, these games possess
some nice properties in terms of existence of equilibria, characterization of the equilib-
rium set and comparative statics. However, complementarities often result in multiple
equilibria (Takahashi [20]), which requires a theory of equilibrium selection for GSC to
have predictive power. Pioneering work by Carlsson and van Damme ([3], CvD here-
after) and Frankel, Morris and Pauzner ([4], FMP hereafter) has provided such a theory
of equilibrium selection with the theory of Global Games. In global games, a unique
profile survives iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Although global games are
widely used in economics (Debt pricing (Morris and Shin [14]), currency crises (Morris
and Shin [13]), bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner [5]), merger waves (Toxvaerd [22])),
the proofs of uniqueness by CvD and FMP are intricate, and have left us with a limited
understanding of the uniqueness result. My main contribution is to introduce contraction
principles into global games to provide a more instructive and intuitively appealing proof
of uniqueness.
My result takes a stronger or a weaker form, which depends on the assumptions placed on
beliefs. Global games are games with incomplete information and players receive a noisy
signal about a random payoff parameter. Conditional on their signal, players formulate
beliefs about their opponents’ signals. The stronger claim applies when these beliefs are
well-behaved or when they satisfy a translation criterion discussed later. Consider the
metric space (C, d) where C is the set of strategy profiles and d is a metric. Let br be
the (joint) best-response in the global game. I prove the following contraction property
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(CP): d(br(c), br(c′)) < d(c, c′) for all (c, c′) ∈ C2 with c 6= c′. Since global games are
GSC, Tarski’s theorem applies to the best-response to show the existence of a fixed point
(See Topkis [21]). If the best-response had two fixed points, then (CP) would lead to a
contradiction. Thus the equilibrium must be unique.
The weaker claim applies when there is no requirement on beliefs. Players receive
noisy signals but the precision of their signal increases as some noise parameter ν van-
ishes. Parameterize the global game by its noise level and let br(ν) be the joint best-
response in this game. Define Cν as the set of pairs (c, c′) for which br(ν ′) satisfies (CP)
for all ν ′ < ν. Then, I prove that ∪ν>0 Cν = C2. In words, the best-reply is a contraction
in the limit because the set on which it contracts approaches the whole set as ν goes to
zero. For every noise level, the global game is a GSC and thus an equilibrium exists.
The contraction property then implies that the equilibrium must be unique in the limit
as the noise disappears.
This contraction result provides a formal basis for the existing intuition that the
global games structure lessens complementarities to the point where we obtain a unique
equilibrium. GSC have a coordination-game “flavor” that leads to multiple equilibria;
this relationship can be traced to how strong complementarities are. But, global games
are GSC and there is a unique equilibrium in the limit. Therefore, the complementarities
in global games must somehow be lessened as the noise level shrinks. This intuition is
set out in Vives [25], who establishes that complementarities are moderated in a specific
example of a global game. My paper thereby provides the first result that formalizes
how the global games structure dampens complementarities in a general global game
framework. The positive slope of the best-reply is a measurement of the strength of com-
plementarities; I show that the best-reply is a contraction, hence it is not “too increasing.”
Therefore the complementarities cannot be too strong which leads to uniqueness.
My results require two assumptions in addition to FMP’s, but these assumptions are
either automatically satisfied or unnecessary in 2× 2 games.1 With some qualifications,
the contraction result is, for 2× 2 games, as general as the previous results of uniqueness
in the literature. Those games are of interest because it is the class of games analyzed
in the seminal work by CvD. These assumptions come into play in general finite games,
but the structure is still general enough to allow for applications to well-known models
like currency crises and Diamond’s search.2 In the currency crises model, one of these
assumptions is trivially satisfied, and the other one is a natural property of the exchange
rate. In the Diamond’s search model, both assumptions are satisfied in the traditional
setting with convex cost functions.
Moreover, the contraction mapping principle sharply leads to uniqueness; once it is
established, uniqueness is transparent. FMP’s uniqueness result is a significant general-
ization of the infection arguments of CvD, and it still relies on iterated strict dominance.
With the contraction mapping, solving for iterated elimination of dominated strategies
is obviated and FMP’s (and thus CvD’s) uniqueness result becomes a corollary of the
1The two additional assumptions are made on payoffs. One is trivially satisfied in 2 × 2 games and
the other one turns out to be unnecessary.
2There is also an application of the contraction result to an arms race model that can be found in
Mathevet [10].
2
contraction argument.
In addition, I argue in Section 2 that the contraction result is simpler to establish
than the results in previous literature. The intuition for the proof of the contraction in
the 2 × 2 case, which is presented in Section 4.1.1, is straightforward and easily carries
over to the general case. However, the notation is somewhat heavy. Section 5 gives the
intuition for this generalization.
Finally, FMP’s result relies on a two-step argument where uniqueness in the actual
bayesian game is shown from a simplified version of the same game. Uniqueness follows
by continuity to this easier environment where uniqueness is more easily verified. This
methodology is not fully informative about the underlying mechanisms of the general
case. While I also consider both versions of the game, I prove uniqueness separately.
One of the advantages of treating the general game directly is that, unlike FMP, I show
there is not always need for a vanishing noise to get uniqueness.
We now discuss some of the related literature. Mason and Valentinyi [9] used a con-
traction mapping approach to establish uniqueness of equilibrium in a class of incom-
plete information games. Their argument requires sufficiently large perturbations from
the complete information case and that players signals be sufficiently independent, or
uninformative about others’. Their theory mainly imposes structure on beliefs. On the
other hand, my paper studies global games, and so the uniqueness typically arises from
very small perturbations from the complete information game. In global games, play-
ers’ signals become fully informative and correlated as the noise level goes to zero. My
uniqueness result instead imposes structure on payoffs. Finally, in a recent paper, Oury
[18] extended the uniqueness result of FMP to multidimensional global games. It is an
important step forward in global games, but her argument is a generalization of FMP’s
proof technique which is different from my contraction approach.
2 A Motivating Example
Consider this example taken from CvD. Two players are deciding whether to invest.
Each player receives a net profit that depends not only on her action and her opponent’s
action, but also on a fundamental of the economy, denoted by θ ∈ IR. The payoff matrix
is the following:
I NI
I
NI
θ, θ θ - 1, 0
0, θ − 1 0, 0
Notice that NI is strictly dominant for values of θ strictly below θ = 0, and I is strictly
dominant for values of θ strictly above θ = 1. Further, there are two strict Nash equilibria
when θ ∈ (0, 1). This is the multiple-equilibrium problem described earlier. Which one
should be played?
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We would like to have a paradigm to select one of these equilibria for each value of
θ ∈ (0, 1). I show how introducing incomplete information solves the problem because
the best-response is a contraction and hence gives uniqueness in the incomplete informa-
tion version of the game. I shall then use CvD and FMP’s techniques in this example to
compare their approach to mine.
The incomplete information arises when payoffs are disturbed. State θ is drawn from
a continuous distribution φ whose support is the real line. Each player observes a noisy
signal si = θ + ν²i of the fundamental, where ²i is distributed according to some cdf
Fi[−12 , 12 ], and ν > 0. The information structure (φ, {Fi}) allows each player i (through
Bayes’ rule) to construct a distribution function Ωi(sj|si, ν), or simply Ωi(si|sj), repre-
senting her beliefs about j’s signal upon receiving si. Let us assume beliefs are translation
increasing for all i which I define next. The cdf Ωi is translation increasing if for all sj
and si, Ωi(sj + ∆| si + ∆∗) ≤ Ωi(sj| si) whenever ∆∗ and ∆ are such that ∆∗ ≥ ∆. It
means that i believes that j’s signal is more likely to be below sj when receiving si than
it is below sj +∆ when receiving si +∆
∗.
In the incomplete information game, it turns out that we only need to consider
monotone strategies (See Section 3.3). So, a strategy for j is fully defined by a cut-
off cj ∈ [0, 1]:
aj(sj) =
{
NI if sj < cj
I if sj ≥ cj
Denote by bri(cj) that cutoff between actions NI and I that corresponds to i’s best-
response to cj. I shall prove that for any i ∈ N , bri is a contraction. That is, |bri(c′j) −
bri(cj)| < |c′j − cj| for all c′j, cj ∈ [0, 1] such that c′j 6= cj. Formally, bri(cj) ≡ ci and if
signals enter payoff directly3 then signal ci is such that:
(ci − 1)Ωi(cj|ci) + ci(1− Ωi(cj|ci)) = 0
or equivalently,
Ωi(cj|ci) = ci ≡ bri(cj). (1)
In words, player i’s expected payoff to playing 1 is bigger than her expected payoff to
playing 0 if and only if the signal exceeds ci. Therefore, cutoff strategy bri(cj) is the
best-reply to cj.
From (1), it is straightforward to show the contraction property using translation in-
creasing beliefs. Take any ∆ > 0, cj ∈ [0, 1] and consider an increase from cj to cj +∆.
By means of contradiction, suppose bri(cj + ∆) − bri(cj) = ∆∗ ≥ (cj + ∆) − cj = ∆.
Since ci ≡ bri(cj), then ci + ∆∗ ≡ bri(cj + ∆). Thus, by (1), ci = Ωi(cj|ci) and
ci + ∆
∗ = Ωi(cj + ∆|ci + ∆∗). But then translation increasing beliefs would imply
ci+∆
∗ ≤ ci, which is a contradiction because ∆∗ > 0. Therefore, bri(cj+∆)−bri(cj) < ∆.
Moreover, bri is monotone increasing and so we have bri(cj) − bri(cj + ∆) < ∆. As cj,
∆ and ∆∗ were arbitrary, we conclude |bri(c′j)−bri(cj)| < |c′j−cj| for all distinct cj and c′j.
3This assumption of “private values” is the simplification of the actual bayesian game that I alluded
to in the introduction. This easier environment is enough to make the point for the contraction result.
See Section 3.2 for a discussion.
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Notice that contraction of the joint best-response br = ×i∈Nbri follows immediately from
the above. Take any c = (ci, cj), c
′ = (c′i, c
′
j) in [0, 1]
2 and let d(c, c′) = maxk∈N |c′k − ck|.
Then d(br(c), br(c′)) < d(c, c′). This definition of a contraction is not the usual one.
Technically, br is a pseudo-contraction or a shrinking map.
To complete the proof of uniqueness, recall that global games are GSC and so by
Tarski’s fixed point theorem an equilibrium exists.4 The contraction property implies
uniqueness.5
In the above example, translation increasing beliefs have a nice interpretation. Intu-
itively, it means that given two players i and j, player i believes player j is more likely to
play her lower action whenever player i increases her strategy (lowers her cutoff) more
than player j. By the complementarities, such a big increase cannot be optimal. There-
fore, this property of the beliefs prevents strategies from getting carried away by the
complementarities by tempering their effect.
The translation property drives the result but how restrictive is it? Many distribu-
tions are translation increasing like normal, double exponential distributions centered at
s, and it is a common feature of location-scale families. We shall see that it is also sat-
isfied whenever Ωi is derived from the combination of a uniform prior and any bounded
noise function. Furthermore, Lemma 2 in Section 7 shows that even if we do not make
this assumption, it holds in the limit as ν goes to zero. This Lemma demonstrates that
for any prior the global game information structure naturally tends to be increasing in
translation for small noise, which is why uniqueness is then reached in the limit only.
Equilibrium selection in the complete-information version of the game is obtained via
uniqueness in its incomplete-information version. For all i, si = θ + ν²i and so si gets
closer to θ as ν becomes small because ²i ∈ [−1/2, 1/2]. Therefore, for a.e realization of
the signals in the unique equilibrium, players play arbitrarily close to some Nash equi-
librium of the complete information game as ν goes to zero.
Now I turn to the alternative techniques that have been proposed so far and I use them
to prove uniqueness in the investment game.6
Like FMP, suppose the prior is uniform and use iterated dominance. The largest
strategy that rationally can be played by player j because of the dominance regions is
cj = 0. In this case, bri(0) = l1 ≥ 0. The least strategy that rationally can be played
by player j is cj = 1, to which i best-responds by playing bri(1) = u1 which is less
than 1. Given the strategies that player j knows she can induce for player i, only her
strategies with cutoff in U2 ⊂ [l1, u1] are not strictly dominated. We iterate on this logic
ad infinitum. By Milgrom-Roberts [11], iterated dominance leads to the existence of a
4The contraction property alone does not ensure the existence of a fixed point without further infor-
mation on its domain (See Remarks in Section 4.1.2). However, this existence problem is made vacuous
by the fact that global games are GSC, and an equilibrium always exists in GSC.
5Suppose the joint best-response br has at least two fixed points, c and c′. Then by the contraction
property: d(c, c′) = d(br(c), br(c′)) < d(c, c′), a contradiction.
6What follows is the application of Section “Intuition for Limit Uniqueness” from FMP [4].
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largest and a least equilibrium in supermodular games: a∗ and a∗.
From there, FMP used a proof by contradiction which relies on a translation argument.
By way of contradiction, say a∗ 6= a∗ and in particular, the corresponding equilibrium
cutoff strategies are defined by c and c in [0, 1].7 Now, translate the smallest surviving
strategy a∗ by µ > 0, until it lies completely but not strictly above the largest surviving
strategy. Then denote one of the tangency points with a∗ by s∗. Let a˜ be the translated
strategy. Since a∗ and a∗ are equilibria, we know that br(a∗, s∗) = br(a∗, s∗+µ). By super-
modularity of the payoffs in actions: br(a˜, s∗) ≥ br(a∗, s∗) = 1. Then since the prior is uni-
form, the action distribution a player expects upon receiving s∗ when her opponent plays
according to the translated strategy is the same as the one she expects upon receiving sig-
nal s∗+µ, when she thinks her opponent follows a∗. But, the strict complementarities of
the payoffs in action and signal implies that when she gets the higher signal of s∗+µ, then
her best-reply to a∗ is actually strictly greater than her best-reply to a˜ when getting s∗.
This is a contradiction: (1 =)br(a∗, s∗ + µ) = br(a∗, s∗) ≤ br(a˜, s∗) < br(a∗, s∗ + µ)(= 1).
Therefore, µ must be zero and so a∗ = a∗.
3 Game and Assumptions
I formally define each component of a global game and then I give their interpretation
in the model.
A (finite) global game is a collection (Γ(ν))ν>0, where each Γ(ν) is a tuple (N, (Ai,ºi
)N , φ, (τi(., ν), fi)N , g, (pii)N) with the following meaning. The set of players is N =
{1, . . . , n} and, action sets Ai are subsets of A where A is a vector space. Further,
Ai = {ai,1, . . . , ai,mi} is a chain with the binary relation ºi such that ai,1 ≺i . . . ≺i ai,mi .
A typical element of the joint action set
∏
iAi is (ai, a−i) for any i. The function φ is a
continuous density with convex support on IR. The function τi is the signaling technology,
mapping IR × IR+ × [−ei, ei] for some ei > 0 to IR — a typical element of this product
of sets is (θ, ν, ²i) — and it is continuous and strictly increasing in all its arguments. Let
e∗ = max{ei : i ∈ N}. For each (ν, ²i), θ 7→ τi(θ, ν, ²i) is a homeomorphism between
IR and IR and for each (θ, ν), ²i 7→ τi(θ, ν, ²i) is a homeomorphism between [−ei, ei] and
[τi(θ, ν,−ei), τi(θ, ν, ei)]. The inverse of these functions will respectively be denoted τ−1θ
and τ−1²i . The function fi is a positive density with support [−ei, ei]. Let (H,º) be a
chain and g :
∏
j 6=iAj → H be a continuously increasing surjection that carries action
profiles into H. Finally, player i’s payoff is given by the real-valued function pii for any
i. If player i chooses action ai ∈ Ai, her payoff is pii(ai, g(a−i), θ) where a−i = (aj)j 6=i
denotes the action profile of i’s opponents.
A state θ ∈ IR is drawn from the real line according to φ whose support contains a
large interval [θ, 2θ−θ] defined later. Then each player i observes a signal si = τi(θ, ν, ²i)
about θ, where ν > 0 is a parameter that determines the degree of noise in τi. Each
²i is distributed according to fi. The signal structure is given by function τi which has
the property to reveal the state if there is no noise or if ν = 0, that is, τi(θ, 0, ²i) =
τi(θ, ν, 0) = θ. There is a case of particular interest, τi(θ, ν, ²i) = θ + ν²i for all i ∈ N .
7Recall the game is symmetric.
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I refer to this case as the linear signaling technology case. The noises are assumed to
be conditionally independent of one another and of the state of the world: each ²i is
independent of ²j for all j 6= i and of θ. Players then choose simultaneously an action in
their action space and payoffs accrue according to pi.
3.1 The Payoff Functions
Players are assumed to have a certain degree of exchangeability in their payoffs. They
only care about an aggregate, g, of opponents’ actions. Exchangeability still allows for
a wide range of applications that remain convincing in a finite setting. Aggregate g will
be specified in more detail later on.
Let A−i be endowed with the product order. Let dpii(ai, a′i, g(a−i), θ) = pii(ai, g(a−i), θ)−
pii(a
′
i, g(a−i), θ), that is, dpii is the difference in player i’s utility to playing ai over a
′
i when
facing a−i at state θ. The assumptions on the payoff functions are the following.
Assumption 1 (A1) [Dominance Regions]
For extreme values of the payoff parameter θ, the extreme actions are strictly dominant:
There exist θ and θ in IR with θ < θ, where [θ−ν, θ+ν] is contained in the interior of the
support of φ, such that, for all i and for all a−i, dpii(ai,mi , ai, g(a−i), θ) > 0 if ai 6= ai,mi
and θ > θ, and dpii(ai,1, ai, g(a−i), θ) > 0 if ai 6= ai,1 and θ < θ.
Assumption 2 (A2) [Strategic Complementarities]
The payoff functions have increasing differences in (ai, a−i): For all a′′i and a
′
i in Ai with
a′′i ºi a′i, a′′−i and a′−i inA−i such that a′′−i º a′−i, dpii(a′′i , a′i, g(a′′−i), θ) ≥ dpii(a′′i , a′i, g(a′−i), θ)
for all θ ∈ IR.
Assumption 3 (A3) [State Monotonicity]
The payoff functions have strictly increasing differences in (ai, θ): For all a
′′
i and a
′
i in
Ai with a
′′
i Âi a′i, θ′′ and θ′ in [θ, 2θ − θ] such that θ′′ > θ′, dpii(a′′i , a′i, g(a−i), θ′′) >
dpii(a
′′
i , a
′
i, g(a−i), θ
′) for all a−i ∈ A−i.
Assumption 4 (A4) [Monotone State Monotonicity]
The payoff functions exhibit Decreasing (Increasing) State Monotonicity (respectively
(DSM) and (ISM)): For all a′′i and a
′
i in Ai with a
′′
i Âi a′i, g′′ and g′ in H such that
g′′ Â g′, dpii(a′′i , a′i, g′′, θ) − dpii(a′′i , a′i, g′, θ) is weakly decreasing (or increasing) in θ on
[θ, 2θ − θ].
Assumption 5 (A5) [Existence of Cutoffs]
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For all i, for any a′′i , a
′
i in Ai and for all a−i in A−i, there exists θ˜ ∈ [θ, θ] such that
dpii(a
′′
i , a
′
i, g(a−i), θ˜) = 0.
Assumption 6 (A6) [Payoff Continuity]
Each pii(ai, g(a−i), θ) is continuous in θ.
We next discuss this set of assumptions. (A1)-(A3) and (A6) are common assump-
tions in the global game literature. FMP make the same assumptions. CvD only require
(A1) and (A6). But CvD’s result is limited to 2 × 2 games so (A2) is trivially satisfied
when there are multiple equilibria, which is the case of interest in selection theory. Fur-
ther, Morris and Shin [13] develop a model of currency attacks that satisfies (A1), (A2),
(A6) and the weak version of (A3).
(A4) and (A5) are however not common in global games. (A4) imposes a monotonic-
ity property on differences. The payoff functions exhibit strictly increasing differences in
(ai, θ), but this increase in the payoff fades (increases) as g rises. Equivalently, this as-
sumption asserts that the strategic complementarities decrease (increase) with the state,
or with the signal when it enters players’ payoff directly. Proposition 1 shows it is
easy to check whether a twice (or thrice) continuously differentiable function displays
(A4).
Proposition 1 Let A ⊂ IR and H ⊂ IR. If a C 2 function pii : IR3 → IR satisfies
∂2pii(ai, g
′′, θ)/∂ai∂θ − ∂2pii(ai, g′, θ)/∂ai∂θ ≤ (≥)0 for all (ai, θ) ∈ IR× (θ − ², θ + ²) for
some ² > 0 and g′′ > g′ in IR, then its restriction to
∏
iAi satisfies (A4). Or, if a C
3
function pii : IR
3 → IR satisfies ∂3pii/∂ai∂g∂θ ≤ (≥)0 for all (ai, g, θ) ∈ IR2×(θ−², θ+²),
then its restriction to
∏
iAi satisfies (A4).
Assumption (A5) says that for any pair of actions and any opposing profile, there is a
state at which the player is indifferent between them. Note (A5) is redundant in 2-action
games since it amounts to “set dominance regions.” When there are more than two
actions, (A5) rules out, for one, actions that are dominated for all θ. Moreover, requiring
in (A5) that cutoff θ˜ belong to [θ, θ] is not necessary because the existence of such θ˜ in
IR would be sufficient for our purpose.8 The following proposition gives some insight into
which class of payoff functions satisfy (A5).
Proposition 2 Let Co(Ai) be the convex hull of Ai. Under (A1) and (A6), if for all i,
pii(ai, g(a−i), θ) is concave in ai ∈ Co(Ai) for each a−i, θ, then pii satisfies (A5) for all i.
Proof: Suppose pii is concave in ai ∈ Ai for each a−i and θ. Pick a′′i and a′i in Ai and
suppose a′′i Âi a′i. Choose a−i ∈ A−i arbitrarily. By (A1), dpii(ai,mi , a′i, g(a−i), θ) > 0 for
8Suppose we only know that all θ˜ ≡ θ˜(a′′i , a′i, a−i) are in IR. Since there are only finitely many,
they all are in a compact interval [l, u]. Then let θ2 = min{θ, l} and θ2 = max{θ, u}. Therefore,
extreme actions are dominant outside [θ2, θ2] and we can then readjust the new dominance regions to
be (−∞, θ2) ∪ (θ2,∞). Now all the cutoffs lie in the non-dominance region as desired. However, by
enlarging the non-dominance region, we make (A3) and (A4) stronger.
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all θ > θ and dpii(ai,1, a
′′
i , g(a−i), θ) > 0 for all θ < θ. Since ai,mi ºi a′′i Âi a′i ºi ai,1, there
exist λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1] such that a′′i = λ1ai,mi+(1−λ1)a′i and a′i = λ2ai,1+(1−λ2)a′′i . Then,
by concavity, dpii(a
′′
i , a
′
i, g(a−i), θ) > 0 for all θ > θ and dpii(a
′
i, a
′′
i , g(a−i), θ) > 0 for all
θ < θ. By (A6), the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists θ˜ ∈ [θ, θ] such
that pii(a
′′
i , a
′
i, g(a−i), θ˜) = 0. Q.E.D
Finally, I wish to emphasize that the contraction result is, with some qualifications,
as general as the previous results of uniqueness for 2× 2 games, because (A4) and (A5)
are not needed in this class of games. These assumptions become effective in general
finite games, and even though the result becomes more restrictive, it captures interesting
applications like currency crises and Diamond’s search (See Section 6). In the currency
crises model, (A5) will be trivial because there are only two actions, and (A4) will be a
sensible property of the exchange rate. In the Diamond’s search model, both assumptions
will be satisfied in the traditional setting with convex cost functions.
3.2 The Beliefs
There are two categories of beliefs each player formulates upon receiving her signal:
Those about the state of nature θ, and those about the signal of her opponents (sj)j 6=i.
I abuse notation and represent player i’s beliefs about the signal of a subset J ⊂ N\{i}
of her opponents by a distribution function Ωi(sJ | si, ν). Let ºst stand for the first-order
stochastic dominance ordering.
I impose the following assumption on the beliefs.
Assumption 7 (A7) [First-Order stochastic Dominance]
Let Ψi(θ|si, ν) be the conditional distribution of θ given si. For all i and for each ν > 0,
if s′′i > s
′
i, then Ψi(θ|s′′i , ν) ºst Ψi(θ|s′i, ν).
Unless otherwise specified, assumptions (A1)-(A7) are in effect all throughout this
paper.
This condition is the only condition we need on beliefs. While it is not a condition
directly on the primitives of the model, it is satisfied by many information structures.
For instance, it is satisfied if the prior is uniform and the signaling technologies linear.
(A7) says that a player whose signal increases puts more weight on higher states.
Although neither FMP nor CvD make such an assumption on beliefs, it must be satisfied
in the limit. Given τi and ²i is distributed on a bounded set, then as the error shrinks
to zero, player i can restrict the potential values of θ to be in any neighborhood around
si. Therefore, if i’s signal increases from si to si + x
∗ with x∗ > 0, then there exists
ν(x∗) > 0 such that i is certain that θ has also increased for all ν < ν(x∗). (A7) is then
satisfied whenever s′′i > s
′
i + x
∗. Therefore, (A7) tends to be satisfied for all s′′i and s
′
i as
ν goes to zero.
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Now that payoff functions and beliefs have been defined, I spell out the important
distinction between private and common values. FMP show that there is continuity
between these two versions of the game, and in their methodology, uniqueness in the first
one provides sufficient grounds for uniqueness in the second one.9
A global game Γ(ν) has either private values or common values. In the private values
world, the payoffs directly depend on the type si. This is the case for the investment
game in Section 2. The expected payoff for a player i who sees signal si and is playing
ai ∈ Ai against opponents who play according to (aj(sj)) is given by:
Epii(ai, a−i(.), si) =
∫
s−i∈ IRn−1
pii(ai, g(a−i(s−i)), si) dΩi(s−i|si, ν). (2)
In the common values world, the payoffs depend indirectly on the type si. According
to Bayes’ rule and given her signal, a player infers the actual state θ she is in and
she constructs beliefs about others’ actions. If we denote by Ωi(s−i, θ|si, ν) the joint
conditional distribution of (s−i, θ) given si at ν, the expected payoff for a player i who
sees signal si and is playing ai ∈ Ai against opponents who play according to (aj(sj)) is
given by:
Epii(ai, a−i(.), si) =
∫
θ∈IR
∫
s−i∈ IRn−1
pii(ai, g(a−i(s−i)), θ) dΩi(s−i, θ|si, ν). (3)
3.3 Increasing Strategies
In this section, we show that under the above assumptions, it is enough to search for Nash
equilibria in increasing strategies because Γ(ν) is a GSC and its extremal equilibria are
increasing in the signal. We can then limit our investigation to the class of best-replies
that are increasing in the signal.
Definition 1 A normal-form game Γ = (N, {(Si, ui) : i ∈ N}) is a finite GSC if, for all
i ∈ N , 1) Si is a finite lattice, 2) si 7→ ui(si, s−i) is supermodular for all s−i ∈ S−i, and
(si, s−i) 7→ ui(si, s−i) has increasing differences.
For more general definitions of GSC, see for example Milgrom-Roberts [11] or Topkis
[21]. The game Γ(ν) is the Bayesian version of a finite GSC, hence it is itself a GSC. By
Tarski’s theorem, the strategic complementarities yield a greatest and a least equilibria
in GSC. Van Zandt and Vives (VZV hereafter) ([24], Theorem 1, p.11) prove that for
Bayesian GSC these extremal equilibria are monotone in signal when signals are affiliated.
In addition, the best-reply to any increasing strategy (in the signal) must be an increasing
strategy. These two results are shown in Proposition 3 which applies both to the common
9There is only uniqueness in the limit for the common values case. Intuitively, as ν goes to zero
players discard any state θ that is too far from their signal and so making decision based upon si being
the true state becomes a good approximation. And whatever their prior is, as ν goes to zero, their signal
gets so precise that the private information completely takes over the public information represented by
the common prior. Consequently, the common values case converges to the private values case.
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and private values.10 As a result, if the contraction is established on the set of profiles
in increasing strategies, then uniqueness will follow.
Proposition 3 Let bri(ν)(a−i(.)) : IR→ Ai be i’s best-response to a−i(.) in Γ(ν), and as-
sume (A2), (A3) and (A7). If aj(sj) is increasing in sj for every j 6= i, then bri(ν)(a−i(.))
is increasing in si. Besides, the greatest (least) equilibrium (ai
∗(si, ν)) ((ai∗(si, ν))) is in-
creasing in si for all ν > 0.
Remark: If the prior is uniform and we assume (A2) and (A3), then the claim of
Proposition 3 holds because (A7) is trivially satisfied. Notice also that (A3) implies that
the best-replies are almost everywhere functions of the signal, not correspondences.
4 The Main Result: Contraction of the Best-Reply
I prove that, under my assumptions, the joint best-reply function in global games is a
contraction. I then use this result to show uniqueness.
Definition 2 Let (X, d) be a metric space. If ξ satisfies the condition
d(ξ(x), ξ(y)) < d(x, y)
for all x, y ∈ X with x 6= y, then ξ is called a pseudo-contraction (or shrinking map).
Let ϕ : [θ, θ] →→ [θ, θ] be defined by ϕ(c1) = [c1, θ] and denote its graph by Grϕ. Then,
let ϕk : Grϕk−1 →→ [θ, θ] be defined by ϕk(c1, . . . , ck) = [ck, θ]. Let (C, d) be our metric
space where C =∏i∈N Grϕmi−2 is the set of profiles in monotone strategies in Γ(ν). For
any pair (c′, c) ∈ C2, let d(c′, c) = maxi∈N maxki |c′ki − cki|. Denote by C−i the set of
profiles of i’s opponents that are in increasing strategies, and for any (c′−i, c−i) ∈ C2−i,
define d(c′−i, c−i) = maxj∈N\{i}maxkj |c′kj − ckj |.
4.1 Private Values Case
By Proposition 3, we can represent any strategy as a finite sequence of cutoff points.
Those cutoff points are called fictitious cutoffs and a formal definition will be given sub-
sequently. We will see that this concept is fundamentally different from the class of real
cutoffs. From now on, let player i’s strategy be (cfi,ki)
mi−1
ki=1
∈ Ci where cfi,ki ∈ [θ, θ] is
the threshold below which i plays ai,ki and above which she plays ai,ki+1. For notational
purposes, we drop the superscript f and we denote these cutoff points by ci,ki , or simply
cki when there is no confusion.
10See Mathevet [10] for a proof
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Players only care about an aggregate of opponents’ actions. I shall consider two dif-
ferent aggregates: sum and proportion. For all i ∈ N , aggregate sum is defined as follows.
For all a−i ∈ A−i, Σ(a−i) =
∑
j 6=i aj. Aggregate proportion synthesizes the proportion
of opponents playing less than some action c. It is defined as follows: For all a−i ∈ A−i,
∆(a−i) = (
∑
j 6=i 1aj≤c)/(N − 1) where c ∈ ∩j 6=iAj.11 For sum, the ordering is clear while
proportion is endowed with ºst, that is, the higher with respect to >, the smaller.
As players focus on aggregates that summarize their opponents’ play, they only for-
mulate beliefs about what g could be. I abuse notation slightly and refer sometimes
to g as an element of H. Let Λi(g|c−i, si, ν) be i’s beliefs that the aggregate is strictly
less than g when she receives signal si given her opponents play according to c−i ∈ C−i.
Notice Λi is increasing in si with respect to ºst. To see why, recall that ²j is independent
of si and τj is strictly increasing in θ for all j 6= i. Therefore, (A7) implies that player i
expects her opponents receive higher signals after hers rises. Since strategies in C−i are
increasing in signals and g is increasing in strategies, we reach the conclusion.12
This paper focuses on the study of those particular aggregates, Σ and ∆, only because
they cover a wide range of applications in global games. The theory developed in this
section applies to all aggregates g which, like Σ and ∆, are increasing in actions and
non-constant.
4.1.1 Intuition for the Contraction Result
This section extends the logic of Section 2 and shows the basic intuition behind the
whole approach taken in this paper. The point is to extract the general pattern behind
Equation 1.
Let Γ(ν) be a global game in private values with N = {1, 2} and Ai = A = {0, 1} for
i = 1, 2. Let A be endowed with the natural order. Let us assume (A1) through (A7).
Consider player j has a cutoff strategy, say cj ∈ [θ, θ]. Observe that when player i receives
signal si ∈ IR and plays a ∈ A, her expected payoff is given by:
Epii(a, si) = pii(a, 0, si)Ωi(cj| si, ν) + pi(a, 1, si)(1− Ωi(cj| si, ν)).
Since strategies are increasing, player i best-responds to cj when her cutoff is the signal
si such that: Epi(0, si) = Epii(1, si). This particular signal will be denoted ci. If we let
δi(si) = pii(1, 1, si)− pii(1, 0, si) + pii(0, 0, si)− pii(0, 1, si)
and ri(si) = pii(1, 1, si)− pii(0, 1, si), then
Ωi(cj| ci, ν)δi(ci) = ri(ci). (4)
Dropping the subscript i, let δ = δi(ci), r = ri(ci) and V = Ωi(cj| ci, ν). Graphically, we
can represent (4) in the following picture
11∩j 6=iAj can be assumed to be nonempty and c < max∪i∈NAi as it is the most interesting case.
12See Shaked and Shanthikumar [19] (Theorem 4.B.10, p.120) for a formal argument on the closedness
of the multivariate stochastic order under diverse operations.
12
Ω
½
½
½
½
½
½
½
½
½
½
½
½
½
½
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
""r
′
r
δΩ
δ′Ω
V V ′
(A2) implies δ is positive. In addition, both sides of (4) are continuous in si from (A6)
and continuity of Λi in si
13 which makes sure the intersection occurs. This unique inter-
section in the graph determines the value of Ωi at ci.
To establish the contraction property, take any distinct cj, c
′
j ∈ [θ, θ] and consider
the best-replies ci ≡ bri(cj) and c′i ≡ bri(c′j). Assume (DSM) and translation increasing
beliefs. By way of contradiction, suppose c′i ≥ ci+ |c′j−cj|. Let δ′ = δi(c′i), r′ = ri(c′i) and
V ′ = Ωi(c′j| c′i, ν). Since ci ≡ bri(cj), then δV = r by (4), but (DSM) and the assumption
on beliefs imply δ′V ′ ≤ δV . By (A3), r′ > r. So, put together: δ′V ′ ≤ δV = r < r′.
This is a contradiction because it violates δ′V ′ = r′, the optimality condition (4) for c′i.
Therefore, c′i − ci < |c′j − cj|. Using a similar argument or the monotonicity of bri, we
obtain ci − c′i < |c′j − cj| and conclude |c′i − ci| < |c′j − cj|.
The contradiction is also clear in the graph: Since r′ > r, the intersection must now
occur at a (strictly) higher value of Ω which, by the translation property, is only possible
if c′i − ci < |c′j − cj|.
Translation increasing beliefs are crucial, but note also the role of (DSM). We know
δi(si) is positive by supermodularity which gives players an incentive to respond increas-
ingly when their opponents’ actions go up. Nonetheless, this payoff incentive is assumed
to die down with the state and so players do not overreact.
Under (ISM), we also reach a contradiction, which shows the overwhelming effect
of translation increasing beliefs. But, it is less visible in a graph than before. Indeed,
it becomes a matter of which side of (4) rises more. I opted for the more transparent
argument here. Further, when beliefs are not translation increasing for every ν as they
were previously, they (uniformly) tend to be as ν → 0.14 This gives rise to several issues
that are addressed in Section 7. But the intuition stays the same. The second source of
problems is in the extension to many actions. Section 5 deals with this issue and it is
treated formally in Section 7.
13This technical result is proved in Mathevet [10].
14See Lemma 2 in Section 7.
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4.1.2 Main Results
The Contraction
Here, I generalize the argument just given, but I defer the proofs to Section 7. First, I
define formally the concept of real cutoff.
Definition 3 For player i, the real cutoff point between ai,α, ai,β ∈ Ai where β > α is
denoted by crβ,α and it is defined as the signal that makes i indifferent between playing
ai,β and ai,α: Edpii(ai,β, ai,α, g(a−i(.)), crβ,α) = 0.
The real cutoff between two actions is the only signal at which a player is indifferent
between them. Below this signal, the player strictly prefers the smaller one, and above
she strictly prefers the bigger one.15 But many of these pairwise comparisons are in-
visible when observing the resulting (increasing) best-response. This gives birth to the
fictitious cutoffs that only select those pairwise comparisons that matter to represent the
best-reply. I will come back to this issue in some detail in Section 5.
The set of vectors of real cutoffs for player i is [θ, θ]`i , and it is endowed with metric
t(c′ri , c
r
i ) = max{β,α∈Ai:β>α} |c′rβ,α − crβ,α| where c′ri , cri are any two elements of the set.
Secondly, I formally define translation increasing beliefs.
Definition 4 For player i ∈ N , beliefs Λi(g|c−i, si, ν) are said to be translation increasing
at ν > 0 if for all g ∈ H, c−i ∈ C−i and all x ∈ [0, θ− θ](
P
j 6=imj−N+1) and x∗ in [0, θ− θ]
such that x∗.1 ≥ x, then Λi(g|c−i + x, si + x∗, ν) ≤ Λi(g|c−i, si, ν).
Beliefs are translation increasing if, whenever i’s signal increases more than all the op-
posing cutoffs, then beliefs increase with respect to ºst. It plays a very important role
in global games as it prevents strategies from getting carried away by the complemen-
tarities. When player i increases her strategy more than her opponents, it keeps her
from believing that higher values of the aggregate are more likely which moderates her
increase. If she put more weight on higher values of g, then strategic complementarities
would make such an increase optimal.
In addition, this translation property is quite natural because translating the full set
of opponents’ cutoffs to the right (left) by x should not change the beliefs on average,
much less for small ν, if the signal was raised (lowered) by x. Then, the definition would
follow by first-order stochastic dominance. Notice this characteristic is verified by many
distributions with bounded support such as doubly-truncated normals, double exponen-
tials, or some betas centered at si
16 and it is a common feature of location-scale families.
The next two results are both contraction results. Recall that C−i is the set of oppos-
ing profiles to player i that are in increasing strategies, and so every profile in this set is
15There are `i ≡
(
mi
2
)
real cutoff points for player i.
16Normal, double exponential and some Beta distributions are translation increasing and bounded
support is not a requirement.
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assimilated to a vector of fictitious cutoffs. On the other hand, the superscript r marks
the real cutoffs.
Proposition 4 Let cri (ν) and c
′r
i (ν) be respectively the vectors of real cutoffs to c−i and
c′−i in C−i. If for any i ∈ N , beliefs Λi(Σ|c−i, si, ν) (or Λi(∆|c−i, si, ν)) are translation
increasing for each ν, then for all c′−i, c−i ∈ C−i and all i ∈ N , t(c′ri (ν), cri
(ν)) < d(c′−i, c−i).
Proof: See Section 7.
Proposition 4 says that every single real cutoff is a contraction of the opposing profile.
But this cannot be applied directly to show that the best-response is also a shrinking
map. Indeed, we said we could represent any strategy with mi − 1 cutoff points and yet
there are many more real cutoffs. Consequently, a lot of them are vacuous and a selection
is performed which leads to Theorem 1. I defer the discussion of this issue to the next
section.
Theorem 1 Let br(ν) : C → C be the joint best-response function. If for any i ∈ N ,
beliefs Λi(Σ| c−i, si, ν) (or Λi(∆| c−i, si, ν)) are translation increasing, then br(ν) is a
pseudo-contraction.
Proof: See Section 7.
Uniqueness of equilibrium is an important corollary of Theorem 1. We know there exist
a greatest and a least equilibrium in Γ(ν) because it is a GSC. However, they cannot be
different by the contraction property. FMP’s uniqueness result in private values becomes
then a consequence of this corollary since uniform prior and linear signaling technologies
imply translation increasing beliefs by Corollary 5 of Section 7.
Definition 5 A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (a∗i (.)) is essentially unique if a
∗
i (.) is single-
valued for a.e si ∈ IR, for all i ∈ N .
Corollary 1 (FMP [4]) If the prior is uniform and the signaling technologies are linear,
Γ(ν) has an essentially unique Nash equilibrium for every ν > 0.
The seminal work in global games by CvD dealt with 2×2 games. In this context, (A4) is
dispensable and (A5) is trivially satisfied which leads to Proposition 5. The proposition
states that the joint best-response in 2× 2 games is contractive, and so there is a unique
equilibrium in 2× 2 global games (possibly in the limit) because the joint best-reply is a
contraction. This result is established under the traditional assumptions.17 Note it is a
private values environment, but it is sufficient for uniqueness in the limit (See [4]).
17Proposition 5 also uses translation increasing beliefs, but as we will see later, beliefs may not satisfy
this condition. Nevertheless, there is an analog result of this proposition without the translation hypoth-
esis, along the lines of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2: Under the traditional assumptions, the best-reply in
2× 2 global games is a contraction in the limit.
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Proposition 5 Let Γ(ν) be a 2 × 2 global game. Under (A1)-(A3) and (A6), if for
any i ∈ {1, 2}, beliefs Ω(cj|si, ν) are translation increasing for each ν, then br(ν) is a
pseudo-contraction and so an essentially unique equilibrium exists.
The proof is omitted but the argument is simple,18 so I outline it here. In Section 4.1.1,
note ri(si) = δi(si)+ dpii(1, 0, 0, si). Hence, ri always increases more than δi by (A3). By
translation increasing beliefs, the right-hand side of (4) always increases more than the
left-hand side whenever c′i ≥ ci + |c′j − cj|. This is a contradiction.
Remarks.
1. Note that the uniqueness result is also supported by Edelstein’s fixed point Theo-
rem19 as soon as compactness of C has been proved. This can be seen by induction
since C = ∏i∈N Grϕmi−2. Clearly, ϕ is closed-valued with compact range and is
continuous. As a result Grϕ is closed by the Closed Graph Theorem and trivially,
it is bounded. Now, suppose that ϕk−1 has compact graph. Then, ϕk has compact
range as it is continuous. Clearly, ϕk is closed-valued and so its graph is compact.
Therefore, Grϕmi−2 is compact for all i ∈ N . Then C is compact.
2. Technically, real cutoffs are a well-defined concept. Beliefs Ωi((aj < sj < bj)j 6=i|si,
ν) are continuous in the signal for a < b in IR
n−1
.20 The finiteness of Ai implies
that for any g ∈ H, there are finitely many combinations of opposing profiles that
can lead to g. Therefore, Λi(g|c−i, si, ν) is a finite sum of probabilities of the form
Ωi((aj < sj < bj)j 6=i|si, ν) so that Λi is continuous as well. Consequently, (A5),
(A6), continuity and |A−i| <∞ ensure that there always exists a real cutoff point
in [θ, θ] between two actions whatever the opponents do. The real cutoffs are thus
a well-defined concept in Γ(ν).
Although translation increasingness seems like a reasonable requirement, it might
be that some information structures do not generate such well-behaved beliefs. In the
case of linear signaling technologies, Lemma 1 in Section 7 tells us that this property is
satisfied in the limit. In other words, the information structure underlying global games
automatically produces translation increasing beliefs as ν goes to zero. As a result, the
best-reply tends to shrink on the whole set of increasing strategies, and every point
that falls into the contraction domain at some ν also brings in a neighborhood. This is
Theorem 2.
Definition 6 Let Cν ⊂ C2 be the contraction domain of the best-response at ν. That is,
for all (c, c′) ∈ Cν with c 6= c′, d(br(ν ′)(c), br(ν ′)(c′)) < d(c, c′) for all positive ν ′ < ν.21
18See Mathevet [10] for the complete proof.
19Let (C, d) be a compact metric space. If ξ is a pseudo-contraction on C with respect to d, then ξ has
a unique fixed-point.
20See Footnote 13.
21Notice that if ν′ < ν then Cν ⊂ Cν′ .
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Theorem 2 The contraction domain approaches the whole space, that is, ∪ν>0 Cν = C2.
In addition, for all (c, c′) in C2 with c 6= c′, there exist a neighborhood U of (c, c′) and
ν > 0 such that U ⊂ Cν.
Proof: See Section 7.
This result has uniqueness in the limit as a corollary. The greatest and the smallest
equilibrium must converge towards each other as ν goes small.
Corollary 2 Let eν and eν be respectively the largest and least equilibrium in Γ(ν). Then,
d(eν , eν)→ 0 as ν → 0 and so there is an essentially unique equilibrium in the limit.
Proof: See Section 7.
Convergence of Equilibria
We have learned that under translation increasing beliefs, Γ(ν) only has an essen-
tially unique equilibrium. A natural question is to ask whether this sequence of Nash
equilibria converges to some profile as ν goes to zero. The answer is affirmative given an
additional assumption of monotonicity on beliefs.22 This is proved in Mathevet [10]. The
proof exploits the smoothness of contractive maps and what I call eventually monotone
convergence. For what we are concerned with in this paper, FMP [4] proved that the
sequence of unique equilibria arising from uniform prior and linear signaling technologies
converges to a limit.
4.2 Common Values Case
Here players’ signals no longer enter their expected payoff directly. I assume signaling
technologies are linear. Moreover, the analysis is done under strict first-order stochastic
dominance of the beliefs.23 This is not more restrictive than (A7) if we assume that for
each (si, ν), Ψi(.|si, ν) has full support. Indeed, for (si, ν), Ψi : [si − νei, si + νei]→ [0, 1]
and thus s′′i 6= s′i implies Ψi(.|s′′i , ν) 6= Ψi(.|s′i, ν). From (A7), we obtain Âst by ºst and
the non-equality due to the strictly increasing support. For example, Ψi always has full
support when signals are linear and the prior is uniform, since fi has full support by
assumption.
Recall that i’s beliefs about (s−i, θ) are given by the joint conditional distribution
function Ωi((aj < sj < bj)j 6=i, θ| si, ν) for a < b in IRn−1, which is∫ θ
−∞
∏
j∈J
(
Fj
(
bj − t
ν
)
− Fj
(
aj − t
ν
))
Ψ′i(t|si, ν)dt. (5)
22Like (A7), this monotonicity assumption naturally tends to be satisfied in the limit.
23This strengthens (A7) to Âst where for any distributions F and G, F Âst G iff F ºst G and F 6= G.
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The joint distribution function Λi(g, θ| c−i, si, ν)24 represents i’s beliefs about (g, θ) and it
is a finite sum of probabilities of the form Ωi((aj < sj < bj)j 6=i, θ| si, ν). From now on, ν is
supposed to be less than η/e∗ where η > 0. This condition results in no loss of generality
since we are interested in uniqueness for ν small enough. Nevertheless, it ensures that
all the real cutoffs are well-defined. I discuss this condition later as a Remark. Finally,
we strengthen all the assumptions from (A1) to (A7) by replacing the existing θ (θ) with
θ − η (θ + η).
Now, I define the analog of translation increasing beliefs for the common values.
Definition 7 For player i ∈ N , beliefs Λi(g, θ| c−i, si, ν) are said to be increasing in
translation (with respect to ºst) if for all c−i ∈ C−i, all x ∈ [0, θ − θ](
P
j 6=imj−N+1) and
x∗ ∈ [0, θ − θ] such that x∗1 ≥ x, then Λi(g, θ| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν) ≤ Λi(g, θ| c−i, si, ν) for
all g ∈ H, θ ∈ IR.
Definition 7 says that whenever player i’s signal increases more than does every dimen-
sion of the opposing cutoff vector, then her beliefs about the aggregate and the state
increase with respect to ºst. Interpreted differently, when player i increases her strategy
more than her opponent, she thinks that greater aggregative values and higher states are
less likely. As actions are strategic complements with one another and with the state,
this statistical characteristic plays a moderating role so that strategies are not carried
away. Proposition 6 and Lemma 3 in Section 7 show that the information structure of
global games implies this form of translation increasing beliefs when the prior is uniform
or in the limit (as ν goes to zero) with a general prior.
The next theorem applies when beliefs are increasing in translation. In this context, there
is ν small enough so that the joint best-response function is a pseudo-contraction. Unlike
Theorem 4, we know that a unique equilibrium is actually reached for each ν < η/e∗;
there is no need for a vanishing noise to get uniqueness. This result is noteworthy because
the translation assumption is sensible and it is often verified, for instance when the prior
is uniform.
Theorem 3 Let br(ν) : C → C be the joint best-response function. If for any i ∈ N ,
beliefs Λi(Σ, θ|c−i, si, ν) (or Λi(∆, θ|c−i, si, ν)) are increasing in translation, then for every
ν < η/e∗, br(ν) is a pseudo-contraction and an essentially unique equilibrium exists.
Proof: See Section 7.
The fundamental result in common values is the next theorem which leads to a unique
equilibrium in the limit.
24This is the probability that the aggregate is strictly less than g and the state less than θ. Continuity
of Ωi in si can be established in a similar way as before (See Footnote 13). Note the joint distribution
function Λi(g, θ| c−i, si, ν) is a finite sum of probabilities of the form Ωi((aj < sj < bj)j 6=i, θ| si, ν) which
are continuous in si. Then Λi is also continuous in si. The continuity of Λi in (θ, si) is actually uniform
for si ∈ [θ − η, θ + η] for all i, as θ cannot be outside [si − νe∗, si + νe∗].
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Theorem 4 The contraction domain approaches the whole space, that is, ∪ν>0 Cν = C2.
In addition, for all (c, c′) in C2 with c 6= c′, there exist a neighborhood U of (c, c′) and
ν > 0 such that U ⊂ Cν.
Proof: See Section 7.
Corollary 3 (FMP [4]) Let eν and eν be respectively the largest and least equilibrium in
Γ(ν). Then, d(eν , eν)→ 0 as ν → 0 and so there is an essentially unique equilibrium in
the limit.
Remarks.
1. FMP proved that as the signal noise shrinks, the sequence of largest equilibria
and the sequence of smallest equilibria in common values converge to the unique
outcome of Γ(ν) under private values and uniform prior.25 In this last case, the
sequence of unique equilibrium converges to a limit, hence all three sequences have
the same limit which is the well-known uniqueness prediction of global games.
2. If strict first-order stochastic dominance of Ψi is weakened to (A7) then best-replies
may not be functions. Since global games are GSC, there exists a greatest and a
least best-response that are monotone in the signal. It is then possible to show
that the contraction domain of those extremal selections approaches the whole
space as ν → 0 (See Definition 6 and Theorem 4). Therefore, the best-response
correspondence is a pseudo-contraction correspondence in the limit.26 Uniqueness
is reached because those extremal selections become arbitrarily close as ν → 0, but
they also tend to have a unique fixed point in the limit (See Corollary 3).
3. Notice that results (in private or common values) when g ≡ Σ encompass the
two-player case with many actions as a situation where each player cares directly
about the action taken by her single opponent. In a two-player game with g ≡ ∆,
H = {0, 1} and each player only cares about a coarse trend of what her opponent
plays.
4. The properties that guaranteed existence of real cutoffs in the private values setting
are sufficient for small ν only. To see why, fix η > 0 and let ν < η/e∗. When player
i receives signal si, she knows θ ∈ [si − νei, si + νei]. Thus, for any θ˜ ∈ IR, if
si < θ˜ − η (si > θ˜ + η), then she is certain that θ < (>) θ˜. Therefore, (A5), (A6),
|A−i| < ∞, uniform continuity of Λi and ν < η/e∗ ensure that for all i ∈ N and
α, β ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, there exists crβ,α(ν) ∈ [θ− η, θ+ η]. Since under common values
signals do not influence payoffs in a direct manner, they now need to be precise
enough for (A5) to act as under private values. Real cutoffs are then a well-defined
concept only for ν small enough.
25This is Lemma 5 in FMP [4].
26See Aliprantis and Border [1] p.552 for a definition of a proper contraction correspondence. Then
the definition of a contraction correspondence is the analog version of Definition 2 for correspondences.
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5 On the Fictitious Cutoff Points
The fictitious cutoffs are the threshold signals that separate an action from its successor,
and they are sufficient to represent any increasing (simple) function. Since we only need
mi− 1 cutoffs to represent i’s strategy and we have many more available real cutoffs, we
need a way of excluding the dispensable ones. The selection will warrant the separation
between Proposition 4 and Theorem 1. Let us start with an example.
Example: Suppose Γ(ν) is a global game with N = {1, 2} and A1 = A2 = {0, 1, 2}.
Further, suppose θ = 0 and θ = 1. Here, there will be three real cutoffs: cr1,0, c
r
2,0 and
cr2,1. But we only need two of them to represent a player’s best-response.
For instance, suppose strategy (0.2, 0.8) is a best-response to cj ∈ Cj. It consists in
playing 0 for signals below 0.2, 2 for signals above 0.8, and 1 in between. In this case,
the first fictitious cutoff, c0, that separates 0 and 1 is 0.2 = c
r
1,0. The second fictitious
cutoff, c1, that separates 1 and 2 is 0.8 = c
r
2,1. Now, consider the following best-response
(0.4, 0.4) to c′j ∈ Cj. In this case, the player never plays 1 except possibly on a set of
measure zero (when receiving exactly signal 0.4). Then the first fictitious cutoff, c′0, that
separates 0 and 1 is 0.4 = c′r2,0, but the second fictitious cutoff, c
′
1, is also c
′r
2,0 since 1 is
not played.
Therefore, the fictitious cutoff points take on values of real cutoffs, but they might switch
real cutoffs from one opposing profile to the other, which makes it harder to identify any
contraction. If each fictitious cutoff was attached to the same real cutoff all the way
through, then contraction would follow immediately from Proposition 4.
The next definition is actually the formal derivation of the fictitious cutoff points from
a set of real cutoffs. Once I have laid out the definition, I explain the intuition behind
Theorem 1 by working through the above example.
Definition 8 We define the fictitious cutoffs inductively. For any i ∈ N , given c−i ∈
C−i, the greatest fictitious cutoff point, denoted cmi−1, is the real cutoff crmi,α such that:
Edpii(ai,mi , ai, g(c−i), si) > 0 for all ai 6= ai,mi and si > crmi,α, and Edpii(ai,α, ai, g(c−i), si)
> 0 for all ai 6= ai,α and si ∈ (crmi,α − ε, crmi,α), for some ε > 0. Given cki = crβ,α with
β > α, then the fictitious cutoff that precedes, denoted cki−1, is also equal to c
r
β,α if ki > α
or, if ki = α, it is the real cutoff c
r
ki,γ
with ki > γ such that: Edpii(aki , ai, g(c−i), si) > 0
for all ai 6= aki and si ∈ (crki,γ, crki,γ + ε), and Edpii(ai,γ, ai, g(c−i), si) > 0 for all ai 6= ai,γ
and si ∈ (crki,γ − ε, crki,γ), for some ε > 0.
This defines a map from the real cutoff points to the fictitious cutoffs. For any vector of
real cutoffs, there corresponds a unique vector of fictitious cutoffs. Implicitly, we defined
the fictitious cutoffs in the context of best-responses only, as they emerge from the real
cutoff points.
Now I set out the intuition for the contraction in the context of the example. I only
prove that |c′0 − c0| < d(c′j, cj) because the proof of |c′1 − c1| < d(c′j, cj) is similar.
First, I show c′0 − c0 < d(c′j, cj), that is, c′r2,0 − cr1,0 < d(c′j, cj). For β > α recall that once
player i prefers ai,β to ai,α at signal s
′
i, then ai,β is strictly preferred to ai,α at any s
′′
i > s
′
i.
20
Therefore, c′r1,0 ≥ c′r2,0 for if it were not then, when facing c′j, the player would strictly
prefer 1 to 0 for signals in (c′r1,0, c
′r
2,0). But for all signals below c
′r
2,0, the player found it
optimal to play 0, so c′r2,0 > c
′r
1,0 cannot be. Then,
c′0 − c0 = c′r2,0 − cr1,0 = c′r2,0 − c′r1,0 + c′r1,0 − cr1,0 ≤ c′r1,0 − cr1,0 < d(c′j, cj),
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 4. Secondly, by the same argument as
before, cr2,0 ≥ cr1,0. Then
c0 − c′0 = cr1,0 − c′r2,0 = cr1,0 − cr2,0 + cr2,0 − c′r2,0 ≤ cr2,0 − c′r2,0 < d(c′j, cj),
and thus |c′0 − c0| < d(c′j, cj).
This argument implies that the map that carries real cutoffs to fictitious cutoffs is contin-
uous in (C, d). The fictitious cutoffs are proved to contract by showing that they weakly
contract as a function of the real cutoffs, which themselves contract as a function of the
opponents’ strategy.
6 Examples
6.1 Currency Crises
This is a version of the model by Morris and Shin [13]. Here, a finite number n of
speculators decide whether to attack a fixed-exchange regime by selling short one unit
of the currency. The current value of the currency is r∗. The economy is characterized
by a state of fundamentals θ which is distributed according to φ on a convex subset of
IR. The currency will float to the shadow rate ζ if there is no intervention from the
monetary authority. The cost of attacking the currency c(θ) is strictly increasing in θ,
reflecting the fact that stronger fundamentals make an attack costlier. Writing 1 for
the action “not attack” and 0 for the action “attack,” let ∆ = (
∑
j 6=i 1aj<1)/(n − 1) for
each i ∈ N . The monetary authority defends the currency if this intervention is not too
costly. Therefore, the cost of defending the currency is assumed to be increasing in the
proportion of speculators who attack, ∆, and decreasing in the state of the fundamentals.
There is a minimal proportion of speculators who must attack, a(θ), for a devaluation to
occur.27 The payoffs are given by:
u(1,∆, θ) = 0
u(0,∆, θ) =
{ −c(θ), if ∆ < a(θ),
r∗ − ζ(θ,∆)− c(θ), if ∆ ≥ a(θ),
where a(θ) and ζ ≡ ζ(θ,∆) are increasing in θ. Let ζ(θ,∆) = r∗ if ∆ = a(θ), and then
suppose that u is continuous in θ for any ∆.28 Let M > 1 and r∗ − c(θ) > ζ(θ,∆) for
∆ > a(θ) + 1
M
.29 Finally, the shadow exchange rate is increasing with ∆ for each θ,30
27Here, I assume implicitly that both a(θ) and n make it unnecessary to know whether or not i herself
attacks. In other words, given ∆, a player cannot alone spark or prevent the devaluation. For example,
assume a(IR) ⊂ (−∞, 0) ∪ (1/n, (n− 1)/n) ∪ (1,∞).
28Note that this condition allows for some discontinuities of a when ζ and c are continuous.
29Suppose M is big enough so the model is interesting for a large range of θ.
30This means that ζ(θ,∆′)− ζ(θ,∆′′) ≥ 0, whenever ∆′ Âst ∆′′ or equivalently ∆′′ > ∆′.
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and for any ∆′′ > ∆′, ζ(θ,∆′)− ζ(θ,∆′′) is decreasing in θ which accounts for the larger
resistance of the exchange rate to changes in ∆ when fundamentals are stronger.31
This is a model where a devaluation does not always benefit the speculators. There
exists an interval after a(θ) where the devaluation is not substantial enough to be prof-
itable. Even if attacking results in a devaluation, it is only optimal after ∆ has passed
some threshold a(θ) + 1
M
.
This game satisfies the standard assumptions of global games, (A1) through (A3) and
(A6). Also notice the traditional tripartite division of fundamentals. If θ < a−1(− 1
M
),
each player has a dominant strategy to attack and if θ > a−1(1), each of them has a
dominant strategy not to attack. In addition, there is an interval in (a−1(− 1
M
), a−1(1))
where the two symmetric profiles are both equilibria. There are only two actions so that
(A5) is automatically satisfied, and (DSM) also holds.
6.2 Diamond’s Search Model
This is a version of the Diamond-type search model of Milgrom and Roberts [11]. There
are a finite number of players {1, . . . , n} who exert effort ai ∈ Ai ≡ {0, . . . , a} searching
for trading partners. The probability of any trader to find a partner is proportional to
her own effort and the sum of the efforts of the others denoted Σ−i. The economy is
characterized by a state of the fundamentals θ which is distributed according to φ on a
convex subset of IR, and each player receives a private signal about θ with the properties
described earlier. The positive cost to individual i for exerting a level of search ai is
ci(ai, θ) and so her payoff is defined by:
pii(ai,Σ−i, θ) = αaiΣ−i − ci(ai, θ) (6)
where α > 0. Since ∂2pii/∂ai∂Σ = α for i 6= j, this is a supermodular game in (ai,Σ)
and so (A2) is satisfied. For simplicity, cost function ci is assumed to be continuous
in θ which verifies (A6), and it is C2 on Co(Ai) for each θ. Moreover, ci has strictly
decreasing differences in (ai, θ), and in particular, there exist θ and θ with θ < θ such
that for all ai ∈ Ai, c′i(ai, θ) > α(n − 1)(a + ε) for some ε > 0 and all θ < θ, and
c′i(ai, θ) < 0 for all θ > θ. For example, costs may be decreasing when learning is taken
into account. The state of the world θ could summarize knowledge in the economy and
as θ increases the marginal cost strictly decreases which accounts for (A3). In partic-
ular, there exists a state θ from which learning (by doing) is so high that each unit
produced decreases the cost. As a result, (A1) holds and since ci is traditionally con-
vex in ai, then by Proposition 2, (A5) is satisfied. Finally, Proposition 1 establishes (A4).
The theory of Section 4 then applies. Consider the symmetric version of the game.
Notice that there exists θ˜ > θ such that c(., θ) is strictly increasing in ai for all θ ∈ (θ, θ˜)
because Ai is finite, c
′(ai, θ) > α(n − 1)(a + ε) and c′ is continuous. Therefore, ai = 0
31Morris and Shin [13] originally assumed ζ ≡ ζ(θ) is increasing in θ which satisfies all my requirements
for ζ except ζ(θ,∆) = r∗ if ∆ = a(θ); but their setting does not allow continuity of u in θ for all ∆.
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for all i is an equilibrium. Since c is smooth and convex, if Ai is rich enough, then
there is also a symmetric equilibrium where effort levels across players are the same.
This equilibrium is derived from the optimality condition in the case where Ai = [0, a]:
α(n − 1)a∗ = c′(a∗, θ). Consequently, there is an interval in (θ, θ˜) for which there are
multiple equilibria.
7 Proofs
Without further notice, the proofs are given assuming (DSM). Most of the proofs under
(ISM) can be found in Mathevet [10].32
Proof of Proposition 4: I prove the result for g ≡ Σ as the same argument clearly
applies to ∆.
Let Σ−i =
∑
j 6=i aj,mj and ρ : H → H be the successor function defined for all Σ ∈ H by
ρ(Σ) = min{Σ′ ∈ H : Σ′ Â Σ}. Let Σ−i =
∑
j 6=i aj,1. Since there is no confusion, the
subscript is dropped for the extremal values of the aggregate. Take any c′−i, c−i ∈ C−i
with c′−i 6= c−i. From Equation 2, we can write i’s expected utility to playing ai when
the other players play according to c−i:
Epii(ai, c−i, si) = Λi(ρ(Σ)| c−i, si, ν)pii(ai,Σ, si) +
∑
{Σ:Σ>Σ>Σ}
(Λi(ρ(Σ)| c−i, si, ν)
−Λi(Σ| c−i, si, ν))pii(ai,Σ, si) + (1− Λi(Σ| c−i, si, ν))pii(ai,Σ, si)
which can be rewritten,
Epii(ai, c−i, si) = pii(ai,Σ, si) +
∑
{Σ:Σ>Σ≥Σ}
Λi(ρ(Σ)| c−i, si, ν)(pii(ai,Σ, si)−
−pii(ai, ρ(Σ), si)). (7)
Now, pick β, α ∈ {1, . . . ,mi} such that β > α. For any Σ, Σ′ in H and signal si, let
δ(Σ,Σ′, si) = dpii(ai,α, ai,β,Σ, si)− dpii(ai,α, ai,β,Σ′, si).
By definition, crβ,α is the signal si that verifies Edpii(ai,α, ai,β, c−i, si) = 0 which by (7) is
equivalent to the signal si such that∑
{Σ:Σ>Σ≥Σ}
Λi(ρ(Σ)| c−i, si, ν)δ(Σ, ρ(Σ), si) = dpii(ai,β, ai,α,Σ, si) (8)
Denote by l(c−i, si) and r(si) respectively the left-hand side and right-hand side in (8).
Let xj,kj = |c′j,kj − cj,kj |, x = (xj,kj)j 6=i and x∗ ≥ maxj 6=i maxkj xj,kj . Suppose by way of
contradiction that c′rβ,α = c
r
β,α + x
∗. By definition, (c′−i, c
′r
β,α) must also satisfy (8). By
translation increasing beliefs, Λi(ρ(Σ)| c−i + x, crβ,α + x∗, ν) ≤ Λi(ρ(Σ)| c−i, crβ,α, ν) for all
32The other proofs under (ISM) are available to the reader upon request.
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Σ ∈ H, and thus Λi(ρ(Σ)| c′−i, c′rβ,α, ν) ≤ Λi(ρ(Σ)| c−i, crβ,α, ν) for all Σ.33 Supermodularity
of pii in (ai,Σ) implies that δ(.) is always positive, but δ(Σ, ρ(Σ), c
′r
β,α) ≤ δ(Σ, ρ(Σ), crβ,α)
for all Σ by (A4). By strictly increasing differences, r(si) is strictly increasing in si.
Therefore, l(c′−i, c
′r
β,α) ≤ l(c−i, crβ,α) = r(crβ,α) < r(c′rβ,α). Since (c′−i, c′rβ,α) does not satisfy
(8), it is a contradiction. Consequently, c′rβ,α − crβ,α < x∗. By a similar argument but
starting from (c′−i, c
′r
β,α), we obtain |c′rβ,α − crβ,α| < x∗. Since β, α were chosen arbitrar-
ily in a finite set and x∗ was any real number greater or equal to d(c′−i, c−i), we get
t(c′ri (ν), c
r
i (ν)) < d(c
′
−i, c−i). Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 1: I want to show first that bri(ν) : C−i → Ci is a shrinking
map for all i ∈ N and for each ν. Pick an arbitrary ν > 0 that is implicit all throughout,
and drop the subscript i when it is obvious. By Proposition 4, we know that for all
distinct c′−i, c−i ∈ C−i and all i ∈ N , t(c′ri , cri ) < d(c′−i, c−i). Let bri(c−i) = (cki)ki and
bri(c
′
−i) = (c
′
ki
)ki . It is to be shown that |c′rβ,α − crβ,α| < d(c′−i, c−i) for all β, α, i implies
|c′ki − cki| < d(c′−i, c−i) for all ki and i ∈ N .
I prove this result by induction for an arbitrary pair (c′−i, c−i) ∈ C2−i of distinct ele-
ments. First, I show it is true for the greatest fictitious cutoff point. Recall that (A1)
implies that ami must be played in any best-response. Suppose that cmi−1 = c
r
mi,s
and
c′mi−1 = c
′r
mi,t
for some s, t ∈ {1, . . . ,mi − 1}. Then
c′mi−1 − cmi−1 = c′rmi,t − crmi,s = c′rmi,t − crmi,t + crmi,t − crmi,s
By Proposition 4, c′rmi,t − crmi,t < d(c′−i, c−i). By Definition 8, crmi,t − crmi,s ≤ 0 because
cmi−1 = c
r
mi,s
means that ami is played right after as in the best-reply, and thus the real
cutoff between ami and at must lie before c
r
mi,s
. As a result, c′mi−1 − cmi−1 < d(c′−i, c−i).
Clearly, we can apply the same argument to show cmi−1 − c′mi−1 < d(c′−i, c−i) and so|c′mi−1 − cmi−1| < d(c′−i, c−i).
Now suppose that |c′ki − cki| < d(c′−i, c−i) for ki, and I prove that |c′ki−1 − cki−1| <
d(c′−i, c−i).
Case 1: Action aki is played both under bri(c−i) and bri(c
′
−i). Notice this is similar to
the case of the greatest fictitious cutoff and so the proof is analogous.
Case 2: Action aki is played neither under bri(c−i) nor bri(c
′
−i). Then, cki−1 = cki and
c′ki−1 = c
′
ki
, and so |c′ki−1 − cki−1| < d(c′−i, c−i) by induction hypothesis.
Case 3a: Action aki is not played under bri(c−i) but it is under bri(c
′
−i). Then, cki−1 = cki
and so c′ki−1 − cki−1 = c′ki−1 − cki = c′ki−1 − c′ki + c′ki − cki . Notice c′ki − cki < d(c′−i, c−i)
by induction hypothesis and c′ki−1 − c′ki ≤ 0 since the best-response is increasing in the
signal. Therefore, c′ki−1 − cki−1 < d(c′−i, c−i).
Case 3b: By a similar argument, if action aki is not played under bri(c
′
−i) but it is under
bri(c−i), cki−1 − c′ki−1 < d(c′−i, c−i).
Case 4a: Action aki is played under bri(c
′
−i) but it is not played under bri(c−i). Then,
33Notice Λi(ρ(Σ)| c′−i, c′rβ,α, ν) ≤ Λi(ρ(Σ)| c−i+x, c′rβ,α, ν) because Σ is increasing in the players’ actions
and, when player i’s opponents lower all their cutoffs player i believes higher actions are more likely and
so are greater sums.
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c′ki−1 = c
′r
ki,t
and cki−1 = cki = c
r
s,w for some s, t, w ∈ {1, . . . ,mi} where s > ki and
w < ki (since aki is not played). Note that c
r
s,w − crki,w ≤ 0 as it is optimal to play aw
until crs,w and so aki Âi aw must occur for higher signals than crs,w. Suppose first that
w = t. Since cki−1 − c′ki−1 = crs,w − crki,w + crki,w − c′rki,w, then Proposition 4 leads to
cki−1 − c′ki−1 < d(c′−i, c−i). Now suppose w 6= t. Then cki−1 − c′ki−1 = crs,w − c′rki,t. Recall
crki,w ≥ crs,w, and notice c′rki,w ≤ c′rki,t because it is a best-response to play aki (in some
interval starting) from c′rki,t and so aki Âi aw must occur before that signal c′rki,t. As a
result, cki−1−c′ki−1 = crs,w−c′rki,t ≤ crki,w−c′rki,w. By Proposition 4, crki,w−c′rki,w < d(c′−i, c−i)
and so cki−1 − c′ki−1 < d(c′−i, c−i).
Case 4b: By a similar argument, if action aki is played under bri(c−i) but it is not under
bri(c
′
−i), then c
′
ki−1 − cki−1 < d(c′−i, c−i).
Put Cases 3a and 4a (3b and 4b) together to obtain: |c′ki−1− cki−1| < d(c′−i, c−i), which
completes the induction part of the proof. Therefore, |c′ki − cki| < d(c′−i, c−i) for all ki,
and so best-response bri : C−i → Ci shrinks for all i ∈ N . For all distinct c′, c ∈ C and for
all i ∈ N such that c′−i 6= c−i, maxki |c′ki − cki| < d(c′−i, c−i) ≤ d(c′, c) which implies that
maxi∈N maxki |c′ki − cki| < d(c′, c). Equivalently, d(br(c′), br(c)) < d(c′, c) for all c′, c ∈ C
with c′ 6= c. Q.E.D
The next Lemma draws its main idea and technicalities from Lemma 4 in FMP [4].
Lemma 1 says that beliefs Ωi tend to be translation invariant in the limit and this is
achieved uniformly in ν for all parameters. Denote
ρx∗(ν) = max
si∈[θ,θ]
max
e∈[−ei,ei]
φ(si + x
∗ − νe)
min
e∈[−ei,ei]
φ(si + x
∗ − νe) ,
where x∗ ∈ [0, θ − θ]. Define εx∗(ν) = max{1− 1/ρx∗(ν), ρx∗(ν)− 1}.
Lemma 1 Let J ⊂ N\{i}, and let K = [θ−νe∗, 2θ−θ+νe∗] be contained in the interior
of the support of φ. Let i ∈ N and x∗ ∈ [0, θ − θ]. Denote
κx∗(c−i, si, ν) =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
ν
∏
j∈J
Fj
(
cj + x
∗ − θ
ν
)
fi
(
si + x
∗ − θ
ν
)
dθ.
Then, εx∗(ν)→ 0 and,
|Ωi(c−i + x∗1|si + x∗, ν)− κx∗(c−i, si, ν)| < εx∗(ν), for all si ∈ [θ, θ], c−i ∈ C−i.
Proof: Since the support of φ includes K, φ has a strictly positive minimum over this
interval. Since φ is continuous, then by Dini’s theorem34 maxe∈[−ei,ei] φ(si + x
∗ − νe) −
mine∈[−ei,ei] φ(si + x
∗ − νe) converges to 0 as ν → 0 uniformly for si ∈ [θ, θ]. Therefore,
ρx∗(ν) = max
si∈[θ,θ]
1 + maxe∈[−ei,ei] φ(si + x∗ − νe)− mine∈[−ei,ei] φ(si + x∗ − νe)
min
e∈[−ei,ei]
φ(si + x
∗ − νe)
 → 1
34If a net of continuous real functions on a compact space converges monotonically to a continuous
function pointwise, then the net converges uniformly.
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as ν → 0. Now, notice that for all parameters in their respective sets,
1
ρx∗(ν)
≤ φ(si + x
∗ − νz)∫ ∞
−∞
fi(z)φ(si + x
∗ − νz)dz
≤ ρx∗(ν), (9)
and thus φ(.)/(
∫
fi(.)φ(.)) uniformly converges to 1 as ν → 0. The cdf Ωi is given by
Ωi(c−i + x∗1|si + x∗, ν) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∏
j∈J
Fj
(
cj + x
∗ − θ
ν
) fi(si + x∗ − θ
ν
)
φ(θ)∫ ∞
−∞
fi
(
si + x
∗ − θ
ν
)
φ(θ)dθ
dθ
(10)
I make the following change of variables: z = si+x
∗−θ
ν
and rewrite (10) as∫ ei
−ei
∏
j∈J
Fj
(
cj − si + νz
ν
)
fi(z)φ(si + x
∗ − νz)∫ ei
−ei
fi(z)φ(si + x
∗ − νz)dz
dz (11)
Consequently,∣∣∣∣∣Ωi(c−i + x∗1|si + x∗, ν)−
∫ ei
−ei
∏
j∈J
Fj
(
cj − si + νz
ν
)
fi(z)dz
∣∣∣∣∣ (12)
≤
∫ ei
−ei
fi(z)|εx∗(ν)|dz ≤ εx∗(ν)→ 0 as ν → 0 by (9).
The claim is proved. Q.E.D
The next Lemma shows that beliefs about the aggregate tend to be translation increasing
in the limit and this is achieved uniformly in ν for all parameters. In the proof, notice
that I only make use of the monotonicity of Σ and the proof would go similarly with any
increasing g.
Lemma 2 Let K = [θ − νe∗, 2θ − θ + νe∗] be contained in the interior of the support of
φ. For all i ∈ N , x∗ ∈ [0, θ − θ], Σ ∈ H, there exists a positive number M(Σ) such that
Λi(Σ| c−i, si, ν) ≥ Λi(Σ| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν)−M(Σ)(ε0(ν) + εx∗(ν))
for all si ∈ [θ, θ], x ∈ [0, θ − θ](
P
j 6=i mj−N+1) such that x ≤ x∗1, and all c−i ∈ C−i.
Proof: I prove the result by induction. First, I show it is true for Λi(Σ| c−i, si, ν). Notice
there is only one way to obtain Σ and so:
Prob(Σ = Σ| c−i, si, ν) = Ωi((sj > cmj−1)j 6=i| si, ν).
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In (10), set x∗ to zero and replace
∏
j∈J Fj((cj−θ)/ν) with
∏
j∈J(1−Fj((cj−θ)/ν)) to get
Prob(Σ = Σ|.), then Lemma 1 shows that the distance between Ωi((sj > cmj−1)j 6=i| si, ν)
and ∫ ∞
−∞
1
ν
∏
j 6=i
(
1− Fj
(
cmj−1 − θ
ν
))
fi
(
si − θ
ν
)
dθ (13)
is bounded by ε0(ν) → 0 for all si ∈ [θ, θ] and c−i ∈ C−i. A simple change of variable
(θ′ = θ − x∗) would establish that (13) is equal to∫ ∞
−∞
1
ν
∏
j 6=i
(
1− Fj
(
cmj−1 + x
∗ − θ
ν
))
fi
(
si + x
∗ − θ
ν
)
dθ (14)
Clearly, the distance between Ωi(s−i > (cmj−1)j 6=i + x
∗1| si + x∗, ν) and (14) is bounded
by εx∗(ν) → 0 for all si ∈ [θ, θ] and c−i ∈ C−i by Lemma 1. Since Ωi(s−i > (cmj−1)j 6=i +
x∗1| si + x∗, ν) ≤ Ωi(s−i > (cmj−1)j 6=i + x| si + x∗, ν), then Prob(Σ = Σ| c−i, si, ν) ≤
Prob(Σ = Σ| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν) + ε0(ν) + εx∗(ν) for all si, c−i ∈ C−i and x ∈ [0, θ −
θ](
P
j 6=i mj−N+1) such that x ≤ x∗1. Since Λi(Σ| c−i, si, ν) = 1 − Prob(Σ = Σ| c−i, si, ν),
this shows the result for the greatest sum.
Now, suppose the claim is true for all sums greater or equal to Σ′ ∈ H. Let p(Σ′) =
max{Σ ∈ H : Σ ≺ Σ′} and show Λi(p(Σ′)| c−i, si, ν) satisfies translation increasingness
in the limit. There are now possibly several (but finitely many) ways to obtain p(Σ′).
Let ck−i be the k-th combination of cutoffs of i’s opponents that leads to p(Σ
′), and recall
Λi(p(Σ
′)| c−i, si, ν) = 1− (Prob(Σ ≥ Σ′| c−i, si, ν) + Prob(Σ = p(Σ′)| c−i, si, ν). Note
Prob(Σ = p(Σ′)| c−i, si, ν) =
∑
k
Ωi((c
k
kj
< sj < c
k
kj+1
)j 6=i| si, ν)
for some kj and since there are only finitely many combinations of cutoffs that result in
p(Σ′), Lemma 1 implies the distance between Prob(Σ = p(Σ′)| c−i, si, ν) and∑
k
∫ ∞
−∞
1
ν
∏
j 6=i
(
Fj
(
ckkj+1 − θ
ν
)
− Fj
(
ckkj − θ
ν
))
fi
(
si − θ
ν
)
dθ (15)
is bounded by m(p(Σ′))ε0(ν) for all si ∈ [θ, θ] and c−i ∈ C−i.35 A simple change of
variables (θ′ = θ − x∗) would establish that (15) is equal to∑
k
∫ ∞
−∞
1
ν
∏
j 6=i
(
Fj
(
ckkj+1 + x
∗ − θ
ν
)
−Fj
(
ckkj + x
∗ − θ
ν
))
fi
(
si + x
∗ − θ
ν
)
dθ (16)
Since Prob(Σ ≥ Σ′| c−i, si, ν) = 1− Λi(Σ′| c−i, si, ν), the above argument and the induc-
tion hypothesis imply that the distance between the sum of Prob(Σ ≥ Σ′| c−i, si, ν) and
Prob(Σ = p(Σ′)| c−i, si, ν), and
Prob(Σ ≥ Σ′| c−i + x∗, si + x∗, ν) + Prob(Σ = p(Σ′)| c−i + x∗, si + x∗, ν) (17)
35The distance is bounded by
∑
k ε0(ν) where the summation counter only depends on p(Σ
′) and so
there exists some m(p(Σ′)).
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is less than (M(Σ′)+m(p(Σ′)))(ε0(ν)+εx∗(ν)) and this, for all si, and c−i. LetM(p(Σ′)) =
M(Σ′) +m(p(Σ′)). But (17) is less than
Prob(Σ ≥ Σ′| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν) + Prob(Σ = p(Σ′)| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν) (18)
for all si, c−i and x ∈ [0, θ−θ](
P
j 6=i mj−N+1) such that x ≤ x∗1, which follows by definition
of Prob(Σ ≥ p(Σ′)|.). Indeed, Σ is increasing in the players’ actions and, when player i’s
opponents lower all their cutoffs player i believes higher actions are more likely and so
are greater sums.
Consequently,
Prob(Σ ≥ Σ′| c−i, si, ν) + Prob(Σ = p(Σ′)| c−i, si, ν) ≤ Prob(Σ ≥ Σ′| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν)+
Prob(Σ = p(Σ′)| c−i+x, si+x∗, ν)+M(p(Σ′))(ε0(ν)+εx∗(ν)),
for all si, c−i and x which proves the claim for p(Σ′). Since there are only a finite number
of such sums, we proceed inductively and we are done. Q.E.D
Corollary 4 Let K = [θ − νe∗, 2θ − θ + νe∗] be contained in the interior of the support
of φ. Letting M(∆) be some positive number, then for all i ∈ N , x∗ ∈ [0, θ − θ], ∆ ∈ H,
Λi(∆| c−i, si, ν) ≥ Λi(∆| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν)−M(∆)(ε0(ν) + εx∗(ν))
for all si ∈ [θ, θ], x ∈ [0, θ − θ](
P
j 6=i mj−N+1) such that x ≤ x∗1, and all c−i ∈ C−i.
Proof: Pick c ∈ ∩j 6=iAj and notice ∆ = 0. Let ζj(c) ∈ Aj be the smallest action in Aj
such that ζj(c) ≥ c. Let c∗j denote j’s cutoff point from which j’s action is greater or
equal to ζj(c). Then,
Prob(∆ = 0| c−i, si, ν) = Ωi((sj > c∗j)j 6=i| si, ν)
As in the proof of Lemma 1, the claim holds for the greatest proportion. The rest of the
proof then goes similarly. Q.E.D
Corollary 5 In the private values case with uniform prior, beliefs Λi(Σ| c−i, si, ν) (or
Λi(∆| c−i, si, ν)) are translation increasing for every ν > 0.
Proof: The result follows immediately from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 (or Corollary 4),
and Ψ′i(θ| si, ν) = (1/ν)fi((si − θ)/ν). Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 2: First, I prove ∪ν>0 Cν = C2. Trivially (c, c) ∈ ∪ν>0 Cν for
all c ∈ C. Now, take any (c, c′) ∈ C2 with c 6= c′. Let l(c−i, si, ν) and r(si) be
respectively the left-hand side and right-hand side of (8). Say (c−i, crβ,α(ν)) satisfies
(8) at ν: l(c−i, crβ,α(ν), ν) = r(c
r
β,α(ν)). Let xj,kj = |c′j,kj − cj,kj |, x = (xj,kj)j 6=i and
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x∗ = maxj 6=imaxkj xj,kj . By means of contradiction, suppose c
′r
β,α(ν) = c
r
β,α(ν) + x
∗. By
definition, (c′−i, c
′r
β,α(ν)) must also satisfy (8) at ν, and so by Lemma 2:
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∑
{Σ:Σ>Σ≥Σ}
(Λi(ρ(Σ)| c−i, crβ,α(ν), ν) + µ(ν))δ(Σ, ρ(Σ), c′rβ,α(ν)) ≥ r(c′rβ,α(ν))
where µ(ν)→ 0 as ν → 0. Since mj <∞ and pii is bounded as a continuous function on
a compact set, then we can rewrite this last inequality as∑
Λi(ρ(Σ)| c−i, crβ,α(ν), ν)δ(Σ, ρ(Σ), c′rβ,α(ν)) + ϑi(ν) ≥ r(c′rβ,α(ν)) (19)
where ϑi(ν) → 0 as ν → 0. Since r(si + x∗) − r(si) is strictly positive by (A3) and
continuous in si, then it has a strictly positive minimum over [θ, θ], call it m
∗. Let
m∗∗ = m∗/2. Note since l(c−i, crβ,α(ν), ν) = r(c
r
β,α(ν)), then∑
Λi(ρ(Σ)|c−i, crβ,α(ν), ν)δ(Σ, ρ(Σ), c′rβ,α(ν)) +m∗∗ ≤ r(crβ,α(ν)) +m∗∗ < r(c′rβ,α(ν)) (20)
Since ϑi(ν) → 0, (19) and (20) lead to a contradiction as soon as ϑi(ν) is less than
m∗∗. It means that there exists ν small enough such that l(c′−i, c
′r
β,α(ν), ν) < r(c
′r
β,α(ν)),
hence the contradiction with (c′−i, c
′r
β,α(ν)) verifying (8). Given this last inequality, it is
also a contradiction for x∗ > maxj 6=imaxkj xj,kj by (A2), (A3), (A4) and (A7). There-
fore, the ν from which we reach a contradiction only depends on i, β, α and on the
direction: from (c−i, crβ,α) to (c
′
−i, c
′r
β,α), or the other way. Since there are only finitely
many players, actions and directions, then there exists ν > 0 such that for all i ∈ N ,
t(c′ri (ν), c
r
i (ν)) < d(c
′
−i, ci) for all ν < ν. The fictitious cutoffs generated by these real
cutoffs then form a shrinking map. That is, d(br(ν)(c), br(ν)(c′)) < d(c, c′) for all ν < ν.
Therefore, (c, c′) ∈ ∪ν>0 Cν .
Secondly, I want to show that for any (c, c′) ∈ C2, there exist ν and a neighborhood
U of (c, c′) in the product topology of C2 such that U ⊂ Cν . To simplify notation, I
do not indicate the dependance on aα and aβ because they live in a finite set and the
minimum over all {aα, aβ} of a continuous function is itself continuous.
Let us specify µx∗ from the first part of the theorem and then construct ϑi. Let µx∗(ν) =
maxΣM(Σ)(ε0(ν)+εx∗(ν)) where x
∗ = maxj 6=imaxkj |c′kj − ckj |. By the Maximum Theo-
rem, ρx∗(ν) is continuous in x
∗37 and then, so are εx∗(ν) = max{1− 1/ρx∗(ν), ρx∗(ν)− 1}
and µx∗(ν) for each ν. Moreover, notice the minimum of r(si + x
∗) − r(si) over [θ, θ]
only depends on i and x∗ and thus its half, m∗∗i (x
∗), is continuous in x∗ by the Maximum
Theorem. Now, let bi = maxsi∈[θ,θ]
∑
Σ δ(Σ, ρ(Σ), si), and define ϑi(ν, x
∗) = biµx∗(ν).
Since µx∗(ν)→ 0, then for any i ∈ N , there exists νi > 0 such that
ϑi(νi, x
∗) < m∗∗i (x
∗). (21)
36For example, let µ(ν) = maxΣM(Σ)(ε0(ν) + εx∗(ν)). By Lemma 2, we know Λi(Σ| c−i, si, ν) ≥
Λi(Σ| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν)− µ(ν) ≥ Λi(Σ| c′−i, si + x∗, ν)− µ(ν) and since δ(.) is positive, then we get the
inequality.
37See discussion preceding the proof of Lemma 1.
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As x∗ is continuous in (c, c′), then for any i ∈ N there exists a neighborhood of (c−i, c′−i)
such that (21) is satisfied at νi. Therefore, there is a neighborhood U of (c, c′) and ν > 0
such that U ⊂ Cν . Q.E.D
Proof of Corollary 2: Suppose by way of contradiction that there is ι > 0 such that
for all ν > 0, there exists ν < ν for which d(eν , eν) > ι. Since {(eν , eν)} ⊂ C2 and C2 is
compact, then the sequence has at least one cluster point in C2. For such ι to exist, there
must be a cluster point of the sequence, denoted (e, e), such that e 6= e. By Theorem
2, there exists ν such that a neighborhood U of (e, e) is a subset of Cν . Now, take two
disjoint neighborhoods U and U in C, respectively of e and e, such that U × U ⊂ U .
Notice such neighborhoods exist because U is an open set in the product topology. Since
(e, e) is a cluster point, then there exists ν ′ < ν such that (eν′ , eν′) ∈ U × U ⊂ U ⊂ Cν
which is a contradiction. Q.E.D
Proposition 6 In the common values case with uniform prior, beliefs Λi(g, θ|c−i, si, ν)
are increasing in translation for every ν > 0.
Proof: Take any c−i ∈ C−i and let ck−i be the k-th combination of cutoffs of i’s opponents
that leads to g and recall there are only finitely many such combinations. Take x ∈
[0, θ − θ](
P
j 6=i mj−N+1) and x∗ ∈ [0, θ − θ] with x∗1 ≥ x. From (5) and using the same
change of variables as in Lemma 1, we get that Λi(g, θ| c−i + x∗1, si + x∗, ν) is equal to
∑
k
∫ ∞
si+x
∗−θ
ν
∏
j∈J
(
Fj
(
ckkj+1 − si + νz
ν
)
− Fj
(
ckkj − si + νz
ν
))
f(z)dz. (22)
and Λi(g, θ| c−i, si, ν) is equal to
∑
k
∫ ∞
si−θ
ν
∏
j∈J
(
Fj
(
ckkj+1 − si + νz′
ν
)
− Fj
(
ckkj − si + νz′
ν
))
f(z′)dz′. (23)
Since fi is positive-valued and c
k
kj+1
≥ ckkj , (23) is bigger than (22). I have already argued
that Λi(g, θ| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν) ≤ Λi(g, θ| c−i + x∗, si + x∗, ν) which leads to
Λi(g, θ| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν) ≤ Λi(g, θ| c−i, si, ν).
I am done as θ was arbitrary. Q.E.D
Unlike the private values case where θ = ∞, (23) and (22) are not equal. Under a
uniform prior (or in the limit), only the difference between her signal and the others’
matters to player i to formulate her beliefs about the opposing profile of actions, and
so she thinks each value of the aggregate is as probable when she receives si + x
∗ and
the others play c−i + x∗1 as when she receives si and the others play c−i. However, she
expects now higher θ in the first situation which she did not under private values and
this explains why (23) is bigger than (22).
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At this point, it should be clear that every translation increasingness type of proper-
ties that is satisfied for every ν by the beliefs under a uniform prior will also be satisfied
uniformly in the limit by the corresponding beliefs under a general prior assumption.
Indeed, for a general prior, Λi(g, θ|c−i, si, ν) and Λi(g, θ|c−i + x∗, si + x∗, ν) become arbi-
trarily close to (22) and (23) uniformly in si, c−i, θ. This comes from a similar result to
Lemma 1 for Ω(c−i, θ|si, ν). Consequently, I omit the proof of the next result.
Lemma 3 Let K = [θ−η−νe∗, 2θ−θ+3η+νe∗] be contained in the interior of the support
of φ. Letting M(Σ) be some positive number, then for all i ∈ N , x∗ ∈ [0, θ − θ + 2η],
Σ ∈ H,
Λi(Σ, θ| c−i, si, ν) ≥ Λi(Σ, θ| c−i + x, si + x∗, ν)−M(Σ)(ε0(ν) + εx∗(ν))
for all si ∈ [θ − η, θ + η], x ∈ [0, θ − θ + 2η](
P
j 6=i mj−N+1) such that x ≤ x∗1, θ ∈ IR and
all c−i ∈ C−i.
The next lemma is a technical result that will be useful in proving Theorem 4.38
Lemma 4 Suppose state monotonicity is decreasing. Then there exists a positive func-
tion δ∗(Σ∗,Σ, θ) from H2 × IR to IR+ that is decreasing in (Σ∗, θ) and such that for all
Σ, si, c−i and ν:∫
H×IR
δ∗(Σ∗,Σ, θ)dΛi(Σ∗, θ|c−i, si, ν)=
∫
θ∈IR
δ(Σ, ρ(Σ), θ)Λi(ρ(Σ), dθ|c−i, si, ν)
Proof: Define
δ∗(Σ∗,Σ, θ) =
{
δ(Σ, ρ(Σ), θ) if Σ∗ < ρ(Σ)
0 otherwise,
and notice δ∗ is decreasing in (Σ∗, θ) by construction, (DSM) and supermodularity. It
is also positive by supermodularity. The proof then follows by Fubini’s theorem. Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 3: Recall that for ν < η/e∗, all real cutoffs exist. Suppose that
state monotonicity is decreasing. By strict first-order stochastic dominance of Ψi and
Lemma 4, Equation 24, which is the analog of Equation 8 but in the common values, has
a unique solution.39 From then, the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. All the
real cutoffs shrink as functions of the opposing profile which translates to the fictitious
cutoffs by Theorem 1. Uniqueness then follows from the contraction of br(ν). Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 4: First, I prove that ∪ν>0 Cν = C2. Trivially, (c, c) ∈ ∪ν>0 Cν
for all c ∈ C. Now, take any (c, c′) ∈ C2 with c 6= c′. From Equation 3, we can write i’s
utility to playing ai when j plays according to cj:
Epii(ai, c−i, si) =
∫
θ∈IR
pii(ai,Σ, θ) Λi(ρ(Σ), dθ|c−i, si, ν) +
∫
θ∈IR
∑
{Σ:Σ>Σ>Σ}
pii(ai,Σ, θ)(Λi(ρ(Σ)
38I thank Federico Echenique for suggesting this Lemma.
39See the proof of Theorem 4.
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, dθ| c−i, si, ν)−Λi(Σ, dθ|c−i, si, ν)) +
∫
θ∈IR
pii(ai,Σ, θ)(dΨi(θ| si, ν)− Λi(Σ, dθ|c−i, si, ν))
which can be rewritten,
Epii(ai, c−i, si) =
∫
θ∈IR
pii(ai,Σ, θ)dΨi(θ| si, ν) +
∫
θ∈IR
∑
(pii(ai,Σ, θ)− pii(ai, ρ(Σ), θ))Λi(ρ
(Σ), dθ| si, ν).
Now, pick β, α ∈ {1, . . . ,mi} such that β > α. By definition, crβ,α(ν) is the signal si that
verifies Edpii(ai,β, ai,α, c−i, si, ν) = 0 which by the last equation is equivalent to searching
for the unique si such that
40
∑∫
θ∈IR
δ(Σ, ρ(Σ), θ)Λi(ρ(Σ), dθ|c−i, si, ν))=
∫
θ∈IR
(dpii(aβ, aα,Σ, θ))dΨi(θ|si,ν) (24)
Let l(c−i, si, ν) and r(si, ν) be respectively the left-hand side and right-hand side of (24).
Let xj,kj = |c′j,kj − cj,kj |, x = (xj,kj)j 6=i and x∗ = maxj 6=imaxkj xj,kj . By way of contradic-
tion, suppose c′rβ,α(ν) = c
r
β,α(ν)+x
∗. By definition, (c′−i, c
′r
β,α(ν)) must also satisfy (24) at
ν. By strict first-order stochastic dominance, r(si, ν) is strictly increasing in si. Denote∫
pii(ai,Σ, θ)dΨi(θ|si, ν) by u(ai,Σ, si). Since Ψi(θ|si, ν) is continuous in si ∈ [θ−η, θ+η],
ui(ai,Σ, si) is continuous in si. By (A3), r(si+x
∗, ν)−r(si, ν) has then a strictly positive
minimum over [θ, θ], call it m∗(x∗, ν), and m∗(x∗, ν) → m∗(x∗) > 0. 41 Now the proof
goes similarly to Theorem 2. By Lemma 3, there is an upper bound as to how much
Λi(ρ(Σ), θ| c−i, crβ,α(ν), ν) can stochastically dominate Λi(ρ(Σ), θ| c′−i, c′rβ.α(ν), ν), that is,
M(Σ)(ε0(ν) + εx∗(ν)). Since it goes to zero as ν → 0, then by Lemma 4 there exists ν
below which we reach, l(c−i, c′rβ,α(ν), ν) < r(c
′r
β,α(ν), ν), a contradiction. By (A2), (A3),
(A4) and (A7), it is also a contradiction for x∗ > maxj 6=imaxkj |c′j,kj − cj,kj |. The con-
traction carries over to the fictitious cutoffs and so to the best-response, which completes
the first part of the proof.
Given εx∗(ν) and m
∗(x∗, ν) (and m∗(x∗)) are continuous in x∗ for each ν, the same argu-
ment as in Theorem 2 applies to establish the second part of the claim. Q.E.D
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